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Early in the morning on October 10, 2000, citizens of Ukraine could have woken up in a different
country, without even realizing it. However, the wonder that the Ukrainian government longed for did
not happen overnight.
The news that had been expected by many for years flashed the Ukrainian information environment
and was interpreted by the Ukrainian officials in a way that suggested that on October 10, 2000, the
Council of Ministers of the European Union had recognized Ukraine as being a market economy. The
information was announced by Deputy Minister of Economy Andriy Honcharuk (Interfax-Ukraine,
October 11, 2000). It was also announced that the statement would be published in the EU Council of
Ministers' official bulletin shortly.
Ukraine was not the only distinguished new "market economy" in the list: the same decision applied to
Albania, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia and Vietnam. The EU's decision, as interpreted
by the Ukrainian official, looked optimistic, though unexpected. Remarkably, none of Ukraine's top-
ranking officials who normally comment on Ukraine's reform efforts have recently claimed that
Ukraine had made significant progress and was a "market economy".
The initial suspicion was that the EU's decision was politically motivated and resembled, most of all, a
sympathy prize to Ukraine for its remarkable geo-strategic situation and careful multi-vector policies in
the changeable political realities of the CIS. It coincided in time with noteworthy ideological and
political changes in the CIS political landscape, reflected not only by the worrying alterations of
symbols of statehood (like the re-adoption of the former Soviet national anthem by the Russian
Federation, to the same melody but different lyrics, likely to be approved at the Russian Security
Council's session on November 22, 2000). The EU's decision was made public exactly when the
"ghost" of a new Union appeared over the CIS. The summit of the Russian, Belarussian, Kazakh, Tajik
and Kyrgyz presidents in the capital of Kazakhstan, Astana, declared the establishment of a "new
economic union", officially referred to as the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC). Members of the
new EEC announced plans for abolishing import duty to ensure free movement of goods, and take
every effort to promote integration of the five states. The latter has already provoked skeptical
comments of those who remember the ineffective performance in that area of the EEC's predecessor,
the Customs Union. The new formation's integration committee is co-chaired by first vice prime
ministers of the five states. Symbolically in the context of the EEC's future, the first comment on the
role of the "solid formation" was made by Russian Vice Prime Minister Victor Khristenko: "Some time
will pass by, and the EEC as well, will, probably, grow the muscles [like those of] the European
Union." Given the depressed condition of the new Union member states' economies, the statement can
be treated with polite understanding, but it is clear today that the new Union formation demonstrates
Russia's growing domination in the Central Asian region and the CIS as a whole. Paradoxically, it also
makes yet another crack on the much-challenged CIS. Presidents of Ukraine and Uzbekistan, who
discussed the EEC at Leonid Kuchma's visit to Tashkent on October 12, 2000, saw the new formation
as undermining the CIS. Their attitude was also reflected in the expressed shared opinion that the
"economic union" was based primarily on the Customs Union, which had proved being completely
inadequate and even harmful for six years of its existence (UT-1, October 12, 2000).
Apparently, the Ukrainian leadership sees the "Eurasian" direction of some of its partners within the
CIS as an attempt to make a closer-knit alliance without "the others". President Leonid Kuchma was
quoted by the media as saying "I thought that any process that is going on within the CIS, even such as
the one that took place in Astana, should not bypass all [other countries] <...> each of us keeps asking
why he was not invited" (UT-1, October 12, 2000).
The recent developments brought forth yet another significant issue. The theme of the GUUAM,
regarded as almost doomed by many experts some time ago, got a new spark of live at the meeting in
Uzbekistan. Specifically, the Ukrainian president and his Uzbek counterpart announced that other
members of the GUUAM would be urged to join the effort of making the group's work more effective
and develop it from an informal alliance to an official, institutionalized entity. In fact, there are some
good reasons for making such statements. The changing attitude to the GUUAM was manifested by the
demonstrative meeting of the GUUAM heads of state during the UN Millenium Summit in New York
in early September 2000. Then Leonid Kuchma stated for the first time that "nowadays we have
reached understanding that we need to act within the framework of the organization" for " so far all
talks about creating a free trade zone within the CIS have remained nothing but talks. Meanwhile,
nowadays none of us has any doubts that the way to the future goes through the creation of a free trade
zone" (Vechirniy Kyiv, September 8, 2000). Hence, the alliance that initially appeared to have some
"anti-Russian" defense flavor (though vigorously denied by all of its founders) is gradually gaining
economic footing. For Ukraine, the tilt towards economic relations within the GUUAM is motivated
primarily by the hopes to develop a common transportation corridor. During the Tashkent summit,
Presidents Kuchma and Karimov agreed to "contribute, in all ways, to the functioning of the Europe-
Caucasus-Asia transportation and communication system". Similar opinion about giving a stronger role
to economic relations within the would-be organization was expressed by President of Azerbaijan
Geidar Aliyev, who agreed that the meeting in New York had laid the foundation for a new stage of the
GUUAM's activity. It is expected that the "new stage" of the GUUAM's development will be economic
integration similar to the EU model. At the recent meeting in Tashkent, Leonid Kuchma added to the
speculations about the future of the GUUAM by announcing that Bulgaria and Romania had also
spoken in favor of joining the GUUAM. Presently it is still unclear what Bulgaria and Romania, eager
to jump on the "second train" to the EU, think about the new prospect, but the intention to involve
South-East European countries to the organization suggest a new development of relations within it and
the growing importance of economic factors that begin to prevail over purely political considerations.
Back to the issue of the new status suddenly granted to Ukraine by the EU, one may note that the
specific "consolation prize" as a soothing tool: the EU's decision coincided in time with the Russian
Gazprom's successful efforts to lobby the European Commission and push the project of building a
major pipeline that would bring gas to the EU states bypassing the territory of Ukraine. Although
Ukrainian Minister of Fuel and Energy Serhiy Yermilov is skeptical about such prospects (obviously
sad for Ukraine) and claims he knows nothing about European consumers' intention to finance the
construction of the pipeline bypassing Ukraine through the territory of Belarus because "that is a
personal wish of the head of the Russian Gazprom Rem Vyakhirev" (Ukraina Moloda, October 11,
2000) the challenge does exist in the mid-term. Presumably, some US$ 50 billion could be allocated for
financing the Russian pipeline project, the construction of which can seriously hinder Ukraine's role as
a traditional gas transit state.
Meanwhile, in the context of the recent announcement of the EU's decision to upgrade Ukraine's status,
there was a worrying and unusual silence of Ukraine's leadership. Before, even far less significant
economic events and achievements in relations with the EU were commented on eagerly and
extensively. This time none of the top officials made any public statements, except Deputy Minister of
Economy and former Minister of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Andriy Honcharuk who
announced that "the recognition of Ukraine as a country with market economy will substantially
improve, among other things, our state's positions in consideration of antidumping cases by the
European Union" (Fakty i Kommentarii, October 12, 2000). On behalf of the Ukrainian parliament,
hopeful but moderately optimistic comments on broadening the state's trade and economic
opportunities in the near future were offered to the Interfax-Ukraina by head of the parliament's
committee for foreign affairs Ihor Ostash, MP (Interfax-Ukraina, October 12, 2000).
Notwithstanding the obvious reason to be glad, the government kept quiet - probably because of the
initial misunderstanding of the EU's decision on Ukraine. On the same day, October 12, the
parliament's official newspaper wrote that "The Council of Ministers of the European Union approved
the decision to grant a special status of a market economy in anti-dumping investigations to seven post-
Socialist states, including Ukraine" (Holos Ukrainy, October 12, 2000). The new status means much
more freedom of access to European markets for our exporters and substantial limitation of tough
antidumping provisions.
Naturally, granting a status of "a country with market economy" is not the same as the "special status of
a market economy in anti-dumping investigations". However, it appears that the "slight difference" was
at first overlooked by the government officials. The session of the Cabinet of Ministers, held on
October 11, the day after the announcement that Ukraine had been awarded a new status, listened to the
Ministry's of Economy report on prospects for Ukraine's accession of the WTO. The new "status" could
have brought Ukraine closer to entering the organization, the dream of market reform advocates, for the
current global economic realities demonstrate that it is practically impossible to be an equal partner in
international trade without being a member of WTO.
The World Trade Organization, founded on January 1, 1995 as a result of Uruguay round of
negotiations (1986-1994), now unites 139 countries worldwide. Currently the Ukrainian government is
engaged in bilateral negotiations with almost 30 states, including the EU, the United States, Australia,
Canada and Japan. Accession of the WTO, an organization that controls 95 percent of the global
foreign trade, has been declared as a foreign policy priority for Ukraine. The first efforts to join the
GATT/WTO were made by Ukraine in 1993. The process of this country's movement to the global
trade arrangement was officially launched on December 17, 1993, when the Ukrainian government
officially submitted the membership application to the GATT Secretariat. Later on, on November 30,
1994, the Ukrainian Foreign Trade Memorandum was submitted to the Working Commission in
change of considering Ukraine's application for joining the GATT. The process of bilateral negotiations
with WTO member states was launched in 1997.
The current government has approached the objective of Ukraine's accession of the WTO directly and
identified it as a priority of its official agenda, approved by the parliament. When reporting about the
progress made in implementing its Program of Action, the Cabinet of Ministers stressed the issue of
future WTO accession - something that had never appeared in the government's reports before.
Specifically, the government's report read that "in order to fulfil international obligations, improve the
customs tariffs on the condition of bringing it gradually to the GATT/WTO requirements, as well as
liberalization of foreign trade and increase in foreign trade turnout between Ukraine and countries of
the European Union, the government has adopted a number of important decisions on abolishing
minimum customs rates, minimum prices for some kinds of imported goods, <...> bringing the
technical regulation system in accordance with European norms, undertaking measures for protection
of intellectual property rights and fighting against bootlegging of audio- and videoproducts." The report
also argued that the "as a result of the efforts, undertaken by the government, the taxation mechanism
in Ukraine is approaching the WTO norms and requirements" (Uriadovyi Kurrier, July 13, 2000).
One may agree that Ukraine has achieved some progress in liberalizing trade in accordance with the
WTO norms and requirements. Those include, among other things, liquidation of the planning-based
system of production and distribution, price liberalization, elimination if the state's monopoly in foreign
trade, introduction of market-based hryvnya-to-dollar exchange rate. However, nowadays there are still
some economic obstacles in that field: indicative export prices, excise taxes that break the regular
national taxation provisions for imported goods, import licensing, export duty, etc. Notwithstanding the
foreign experts' skepticism, government officials believe that the issue of Ukraine's membership in
WTO may be considered in the summer of 2001 (Ukraina Moloda, July 25, 2000).
Obviously, the decision of the EU Council of Ministers of October 10, 2000, gave a reason for hope. If
granted, the market economy status could be seen as a significant step forward to gaining the associate
membership of the EU. In accordance with the EU Declaration, approved in June 1993 in Copenhagen,
a leading selection criteria was "the existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the ability to
cope with the pressure of competition and market forces within the Union." As part of its "multi-
vector" policy, Ukraine is seeking to actively promote its EU integration policy in order to gain the full
membership of the EU in future. Ukraine's willingness to become an associate member of the EU was
officially manifested for the first time in mid-1998 during the first session of the Ukraine-EU
Cooperation Council. According to Ukraine's Strategy of Integration with the EU (approved on June
11, 1998), gaining such status is the mid-term policy priority for Ukraine. A few weeks ago President
of Ukraine approved the Program of Ukraine's Integration with the EU, drafted by the government. A
key emphasis in that document is made on the process of adaptation of the Ukrainian legislation to that
of the EU (Uriadovyi Kurrier, September 27, 2000).
Naturally, itwould be nave to hope that Ukraine's pro-market declarations would immediately result in
a massive arrival of foreign investors. However, the decision of the EU Council of Ministers - should it
be the decision on recognizing Ukraine as a market economy as the Ukrainian leadership wanted it so
much could be seen primarily as a brilliant political step made by the EU towards Ukraine. The step
that would support hopes that Ukraine would gradually rid itself of the unofficial status of the "buffer
zone" and leaves Russia's "shadow" on the contemporary geopolitical map. Even though nowadays "the
level of nominal GDP per capita in Ukraine is almost 40 times less that the average in 15 EU member
states (Ukraina na shlyakhy yevropeiskoi integratsii, Analytical and practical reference book, Kyiv
2000).
Yet, no wonder happened this time. When looked at more carefully, the "consolation prize" proved to
be different from what the Ukrainian leadership wanted it to be. Not that the "bad" Europe failed to do
what the official Ukraine was hoping for. The distrust to the information about the "market economy
status" reportedly granted to Ukraine , and the logical question "what for?" asked by anyone who is at
least relatively informed about Ukraine's current economic condition are the consequences of Ukraine's
own inertia in implementing the reforms. Almost immediately after the Ukrainian government official
offered his interpretation of the EU decision, a representative of the EU Council of Ministers had to
announce that the Ukrainians took the given for the desired. Instead, the representative said, the
Council of Ministers decided to provide seven states of the former Soviet camp, Ukraine included, a
special status of a market economy country for antidumping investigations. "The matter was not the
market economy status", the EU official was quoted as saying (Segodnya, October 14, 2000). Hence,
the market economy status for Ukraine remains a matter of the future, and the question "why is that?"
sounds irrelevant in the context.
